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The Invisible Middlemen: A Critique and Call for 
Reform of the Data Broker Industry   
Ashley Kuempel*  
Abstract: We live in the era of Big Data, which seeks to commoditize our 
personal preferences for pecuniary gain. In this changing landscape, data 
brokers, or information reselling companies, compile information about 
individuals from a wide range of sources and subsequently sell this information 
to businesses worldwide. Such practices, however, mostly take place in the 
shadows without consumers’ knowledge or consent, compromising their 
individual rights to privacy. Further, data brokers often aggregate raw pieces of 
individual information in a discriminatory manner, leaving consumers 
vulnerable to predatory and unsavory marketing practices. A 2014 Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC) Report, Data Brokers: A Call for Transparency and 
Accountability, specifically addressed such concerns raised by the data broker 
industry. This Comment analyzes the FTC’s findings and demonstrates that the 
FTC’s recommendations, while a step in the right direction, missed the mark on 
adequate data privacy reform. Rather than taking a piecemeal approach to data 
privacy in the United States, comprehensive legislation similar to the EU’s Data 
Privacy Directive is necessary to ameliorate the privacy and discrimination 
concerns facing American consumers today. 
  
 
* J.D., Northwestern University, 2016; B.A., University of Texas, 2012. The author would like to thank 
Jefferson Harwell, W. Tyler Perry, and Joe Kim for their valuable feedback. All errors and omissions in 
this paper remain with the author. 
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“[H]e that filches from me my good name 
Robs me of that which not enriches him, 
And makes me very poor indeed.” 
—William Shakespeare, Othello 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
Are you a Spanish-speaking Republican smoker who occasionally 
gambles? Or a diabetic, Catholic single mother who drives a Honda? The 
data broker industry is currently collecting all of this information and more 
behind the scenes without your knowledge.1 Data brokers often know “as 
much or more about us than our family and friends, including [information 
about] our online and in-store purchases, our political and religious 
affiliations, our income and socioeconomic status, and more.”2 Data brokers 
use “billions of individual data points to produce detailed portraits of 
virtually every American consumer.”3 As one direct marketer put it, data 
profiling makes it easy for data brokers to “keep up with the Joneses as well 
as the Johnsons, the Francos, the Garcias, the Wongs and all the others.”4 
The rise of the data brokers coincided directly with the increase of big 
data in the marketing sphere.5 Big data is defined as “high-volume, high-
velocity, and/or high-variety information assets that require new forms of 
processing to enable enhanced decision making, insight discovery and 
process optimization.”6 Though the practice of collecting and selling 
consumer data to businesses is hardly novel, the unprecedented increase in 
the volume of data has made it difficult for traditional data processing 
 
 1 EDITH RAMIREZ ET AL., FED. TRADE COMM’N, DATA BROKERS: A CALL FOR TRANSPARENCY AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY i (2014), http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/data-brokers-call-
transparency-accountability-report-federal-trade-commission-may-2014/140527databrokerreport.pdf 
[hereinafter RAMIREZ ET AL., 2014 DATA BROKERS REPORT] (The FTC defined the term “data broker” 
as a company that “collect[s] consumers’ personal information and resell[s] or share[s] that information 
with others.”). 
 2  Elizabeth Dwoskin, FTC Wants More Transparency from Data Brokers, WALL ST. J. (May 27, 
2014, 6:25 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303903304579588090710049208.  
 3  Craig Timberg, Brokers Use ‘Billions’ of Data Points to Profile Americans, WASH. POST (May 
27, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/brokers-use-billions-of-data-points-to-
profile-americans/2014/05/27/b4207b96-e5b2-11e3-a86b-362fd5443d19_story.html.  
 4  Joel R. Reidenberg, Setting Standards for Fair Information Practice in the U.S. Private Sector, 80 
IOWA L. REV. 497, 523 (1995) (referring to the discriminatory practices of data brokers described 
below). 
 5  See Richard Martinez, Who’s Mining the Store? Big Data Brokers and the Rise of Data Mining, 
INSIDE COUNCIL (June 20, 2014), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2014/06/20/whos-mining-the-store-
big-data-brokers-and-the-ris.  
 6  Michael Matzer, What Exactly Is Big Data?, SAP NEWS CENTER (Nov. 20, 2012), 
http://www.news-sap.com/what-exactly-is-big-data/.  
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applications to keep up.7 This is where data brokers come in. As an initial 
matter, data brokers, or information reselling companies, collect consumer 
information from a wide variety of sources.8 They then “extract insight and 
information from a data set” and “transform it into an understandable 
structure” for further use in marketing.9 Data brokers package data by 
placing consumers into categories, or “buckets,”10 based on the vast 
amounts of raw data acquired from online and offline sources alike. They 
then sell this aggregated data to marketing companies, who use the 
information to directly target consumers.11  
 A glaring drawback exists in this convenient set up between data 
brokers and marketing companies—it takes place without consumers’ 
knowledge or consent.12 Because data brokers operate mostly beyond the 
gaze of the public eye, individuals are largely unaware of their existence 
and their monumental impact on day-to-day transactions.13 This is 
problematic for two reasons: (1) it invades consumers’ rights to privacy and 
(2) subjects them to unwarranted, and often unforeseeable, discrimination.14  
For one, consumers currently “have no federal statutory right to know what 
information data brokers have compiled about them for marketing purposes, 
or even which data brokers hold any such information.”15 Consequentially, 
“personal information has become a commodity” that is bought and sold by 
companies “almost entirely at the expense of personal privacy.”16 Further, 
 
 7  Ife Adedapo, Application of big data in business, PUNCH (Jan. 9, 2015), 
http://www.punchng.com/business/am-business/application-of-big-data-in-business/ (last visited Sept. 8, 
2015). 
 8  Commercial sources include, but are not limited to, retailers and catalog companies, magazine 
publishers, registration websites (such as retail, news, and travel sites), financial service companies, 
online advertising networks, telephone companies, marketing surveys, warranty registrations, contests, 
and other data brokers. RAMIREZ ET AL., 2014 DATA BROKERS REPORT, supra note 1, at 13–14. 
 9  Adedapo, supra note 7.  
 10  S. COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCI., & TRANSP., OFF. OF OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS 
MAJORITY STAFF, A REVIEW OF THE DATA BROKER INDUSTRY: COLLECTION, USE, AND SALE OF 
CONSUMER DATA FOR MARKETING PURPOSES i (2013) (report for Senator Rockefeller, Chairman, S. 
Comm. On Commerce, Sci., & Transp.), http://www.commerce.senate.gov/public/?a=Files.Serve 
&File_id=0d2b3642-6221-4888-a631-08f2f255b577. 
 11  Id. at 12.  
 12  RAMIREZ ET AL., 2014 DATA BROKERS REPORT, supra note 1, at vii; see, e.g., Cynthia Alice 
Andrews, Breaking It Down: The Data On Data Brokers, FLIPTHEMEDIA (Feb. 9, 2015), 
http://flipthemedia.com/2015/02/breaking-data-data-brokers/ (describing how data brokers purchase 
consumer data, such as payment methods, types of purchases, and the like, from commercial sources 
without consumer knowledge). 
 13  See RAMIREZ ET AL., 2014 DATA BROKERS REPORT, supra note 1, app. C-1 (concurring 
statement of Commissioner Julie Brill at C-1). 
 14  See RAMIREZ ET AL., 2014 DATA BROKERS REPORT, supra note 1, at 46–47 (explaining how data 
brokers combine and analyze data about consumers to “make inferences about them, including 
potentially sensitive inferences.”).  
 15  S. COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCI., & TRANSP., supra note 10, at 3. 
 16  ANN CAVOUKIAN, ONTARIO INFORMATION AND PRIVACY COMMISSIONER, PRIVACY AS A 
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and perhaps most importantly, placing consumers in “buckets” allows 
marketing companies to discriminate against individuals and subject them 
to unequal access to information, differential pricing, and predatory 
practices.17 Thus, while data brokers and marketing companies prosper,18 
consumers are continuously hurt by this “vogue for data.”19 In the words of 
FTC Commissioner Julie Brill, data broker profiles “have the ability to not 
only rob us of our good name, but also to lead to lost economic 
opportunities, higher costs and other significant harm.”20  
A 2014 Federal Trade Commission (FTC) report, Data Brokers: A 
Call for Transparency and Accountability (FTC Report), attempted to “lift 
[this] veil of secrecy . . . shroud[ing] the data broker industry.”21 The FTC 
performed a study of nine data brokers representing a cross-section of the 
industry, which included over 1,000 companies.22 The FTC Report focused 
on three products data brokers create: (1) marketing products, (2) risk 
mitigation products, and (3) people search products.23  This Comment will 
focus on the FTC’s legislative recommendations regarding marketing 
products alone. 
The FTC Report’s conclusions, which include the privacy and 
discrimination concerns discussed above, should give Congress a “powerful 
and disturbing wake up call.”24 Though Congress has addressed data 
 
FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHT VS. AN ECONOMIC RIGHT: AN ATTEMPT AT CONCILIATION i (1999).  
 17  See S. COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCI., & TRANSP., supra note 10, at 6–7.  
 18  In 2012, the data broker industry generated $150 billion in revenue, which is twice the size of the 
entire intelligence budget of the U.S. government. Matt Kapko, Inside the Shadowy World of Data 
Brokers, CIO (Mar. 27, 2014, 8:00 AM) http://www.cio.com/article/2377591/data-management/inside-
the-shadowy-world-of-data-brokers.html (In a statement to members of Congress, Digital Marketing 
Association claimed that in the digital age, “data-driven marketing has become the fuel on which 
America’s free market engine runs.”).   
 19  Konstantin Kakaes, The big dangers of ‘big data,’ CNN (Feb. 4, 2015, 12:11 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2015/02/02/opinion/kakaes-big-data/index.html.  
 20  RAMIREZ ET AL., 2014 DATA BROKERS REPORT, supra note 1, app. C-1 (concurring statement of 
Commissioner Julie Brill at C-3); see also, id. at vi (describing how data brokers have the potential to 
rob consumers of economic opportunities) (“For example, while a data broker could infer that a 
consumer belongs in a data segment for ‘Biker Enthusiasts,’ which would allow a motorcycle dealership 
to offer the consumer coupons, an insurance company using the same segment might infer that the 
consumer engages in risky behavior.”).   
 21  Sam Pfeifle, Industry Reaction to FTC Data Broker Report: Eh., THE PRIVACY ADVISOR (May 
28, 2014), https://privacyassociation.org/news/a/industry-reaction-to-ftc-data-brokers-report-eh/ 
(statement by FTC Commissioner Edith Ramirez).  
 22  RAMIREZ ET AL., 2014 DATA BROKERS REPORT, supra note 1, at i; Though the FTC’s general 
role is to investigate certain practices and make legislative recommendations, it also has the power to 
declare data broker practices “unlawful” should they constitute “unfair or deceptive acts.” 15 U.S.C. § 
45(a)(1) (1982). The FTC, however, did not declare data brokers “unlawful” in its report.  
 23  RAMIREZ ET AL., 2014 DATA BROKERS REPORT, supra note 1, at i. 
 24  Steve Lohr, New Curbs Sought on the Personal Data Industry, N. Y. TIMES (May 27, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/28/technology/ftc-urges-legislation-to-shed-more-light-on-data-
collection.html?_r=0 (statement by Jeffrey Chester, executive director of the Center for Digital 
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privacy in certain sectors, no all-encompassing data privacy legislation 
exists to protect consumers from data brokers in the marketing realm.25 The 
FTC made several legislative recommendations in the FTC Report, most of 
which aimed to increase the transparency of data brokers.26 Such proposals 
included (1) creating a centralized Internet portal in which data brokers 
identify themselves,27 (2) mandating disclosure requirements regarding data 
brokers’ use of aggregated data,28 and (3) increasing transparency regarding 
the sources of data brokers.29   
The FTC’s proposals, however, missed the mark—they lacked 
adequate individual protections in a world where the consumer “is not the 
customer, but the product.”30 Congress should strive for a more 
comprehensive approach similar to the European Union’s Data Privacy 
Directive (Data Directive) in order to adequately improve consumer rights 
in the big data industry.31 This Comment will examine the dire effects of 
big data practices on American consumers and the need for legislation 
similar to the Data Directive. Due to the considerable differences between 
the United States and the EU’s approach to privacy32 and the different 
historical bases underlying these approaches,33 it is unrealistic to expect 
Congress to replicate the Data Directive on its first try.34 Rather, this 
 
Democracy).  
 25  Ieuan Jolly, Data Protection in United States: Overview, PRACTICAL LAW (July 1, 2015), 
http://us.practicallaw.com/6-502-0467#null.   
 26  RAMIREZ ET AL., 2014 DATA BROKERS REPORT, supra note 1, at 49–53.  
 27  Id. at 52. 
 28  Id. 
 29  Id.  
 30  Lohr, supra note 24 (statement by Marc Rotenberg, Executive Director of the Electronic Privacy 
Information Center).   
 31  See Jennifer M. Myers, Creating Data Protection Legislation in the United States: An 
Examination of Current Legislation in the European Union, Spain, and the United States, 29 CASE W. 
RES. J. INT’L L. 109, 114 (1997) (“The United States should adopt comprehensive data legislation 
immediately.”).  
 32  “Principally, there are two main approaches to protecting an individuals ‘right’ of privacy: 
legislation and self-regulation, with the Europeans [favoring] the former and the Americans inclined 
towards the latter.” CAVOUKIAN, supra note 16, at i; see also Fred H. Cate, The Changing Face of 
Privacy Protection in the European Union and the United States, 33 IND. L. REV. 173, 196 (1999) 
(“When compared with the omnibus, centralized data protection of the EU directive and member states’ 
national laws, U.S. privacy protection stands in stark contrast and to some observers seems to pale 
altogether.”). 
 33  DONALD C. DOWLING, JR., WHITE & CASE, INTERNATIONAL DATA PROTECTION AND PRIVACY 
LAW 4 (2009), http://www.whitecase.com/files/publication/367982f8-6dc9-478e-ab2f-
5fdf2d96f84a/presentation/publicationattachment/30c48c85-a6c4-4c37-84bd-
6a4851f87a77/article_intldataprotectionandprivacylaw_v5.pdf  (“Nefarious uses of secret files under 
World War II-era fascists and post-War Communists instilled in many Europeans an acute fear of the 
unfettered abuse of personal information⎯a fear that lingers to this day. . . . This is a cultural issue 
different for frontier-spirited Americans to understand . . . .”). 
 34  Data privacy laws are inextricably linked to the cultural and social norms of the countries from 
which they emerge. The United States and Europe, while similar to some extent, vary considerably in 
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Comment argues that the United States should adopt the Data Directive’s 
specific individual safeguards in order to protect consumers from data 
brokers. The ample privacy and discrimination concerns emerging from big 
data practices outweigh the benefits of direct marketing in the private 
sector. As such, adequate legislation should include, at a minimum, the 
same provisions from the Data Directive that ensure that the burden of 
protecting consumers falls on the data collectors, rather than the consumers 
themselves.35 Though revamping the U.S. data privacy regime could impose 
significant burdens on marketing companies,36 such reform is necessary to 
ameliorate the rights of American individuals. 
In order to examine the thesis laid out in the preceding paragraph, this 
Comment will proceed as follows. Part I of this Comment will address the 
current data privacy framework in the United States and the privacy and 
discrimination concerns it presents to consumers.37 Part II of this Comment 
will explain why each of the legislative recommendations made by the FTC 
Report does not adequately protect American consumers. In Part III, this 
Comment will demonstrate why certain provisions within the EU’s Data 
Directive should be used as a model for future U.S. data broker legislation. 
Finally, the Conclusion will offer solutions. Ultimately, the potential harm 
to consumers outweighs the benefits of big data, and Congress should err on 
the side of overprotection by passing legislation in line with the Data 
Directive.  
 I. DATA PRIVACY IN THE UNITED STATES  
 A. U.S. Sectoral Approach  
According to Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, “the right to life . . . 
[means] the right to enjoy life⎯the right to be let alone.”38  Data brokers in 
 
their social, political, and historical backdrops. See Christopher Kuner, Data Protection Law and 
International Jurisdiction on the Internet (Part 2), 18 INT’L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 227, 243 (2010) (“Data 
protection law around the world is based on divergent cultural and legal values.”); see also DOWLING, 
JR., supra note 33, at 4. 
 35  Council Directive 95/46, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC) [hereinafter Data Directive]; Section IV, 
Article II of the Directive requires that upon data collection, a controller must “inform the data subject 
of the controller’s identity and its purpose for processing the data.” Consumers also have the right to 
have inaccurate data rectified and can withhold person information in certain circumstances. E.g., id. 
§ IV, art. II.  
 36  See Gregory Shaffer, Globalization and Social Protection: The Impact of EU and International 
Rules in the Ratcheting Up of U.S. Privacy Standards, 25 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 18 (2000). 
 37  Id.  
 38  Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 213 n.1 
(1890) (Warren and Brandeis’ revolutionary law review advocated for the existence of an implicit right 
to privacy, claiming that “the elasticity of our law, its adaptability to new conditions, the capacity for 
growth, which has enabled [our law] to meet the wants of an ever changing society and to apply 
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the private sector, however, continually deprive American consumers of 
this right. In the United States, no generalized protection exists to shield 
consumers from the processing of their personal information by the private 
sector.39 For one, there is no explicit right to privacy in the Constitution.40  
The Supreme Court has only recognized the implied right to privacy with 
respect to “intrusive government activities,”41 not to safeguard individuals 
from the private sector. Because this Constitutional common law solely 
focuses on the public sector, it provides little to no protection in a world 
where “big business is the real Big Brother.”42 And as the FTC Report 
pointed out, in today’s economy, “Big Data is big business.”43 
Further, no comprehensive legislation exists in the United States 
regarding data privacy.44 Congress employs a “sectoral approach” to data 
collection, enacting a series of unconnected laws targeting specific 
markets.45 For example, Congress regulates particular categories of data, 
such as financial or health information,46 but leaves data collection in the 
marketing sphere largely unregulated.47 This “patchwork system” of federal 
 
immediate relief for every recognized wrong, have been its greatest boast.”); Joel E. Smith, Invasion of 
Privacy by Sale or Rental List of Customers, Subscribers, or the Like, to One Who Will Use it for 
Advertising Purposes, 82 A.L.R.3d 772 (1978) (“[I]t was not until the publication in 1890 of a law 
review article by Warren and Brandeis that the right [to privacy] was introduced and defined as an 
independent right and the distinctive principles upon which it is based were formulated.”).  
 39  See Shaffer, supra note 36, at 24. 
 40  Though the Bill of Rights arguably protects specific aspects of privacy, there is no express right 
to privacy in the Constitution. See, e.g. U.S. CONST. amend. I (protects the privacy of beliefs); U.S. 
CONST. amend. IV (privacy of the person and his possessions against unreasonable searches and 
seizures).  
 41  See Cate, supra note 32, at 196; see, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) 
(holding that federal authorities’ use of an electronic listening device outside of a telephone booth used 
by the plaintiff was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment); see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 
381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (standing for the proposition that specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have 
“penumbras” which encompass an individual’s right to make personal decisions free from government 
intrusion).  
 42  CAVOUKIAN, supra note 16, at 1 (statement by Ann Wells Branscomb, a highly respected privacy 
scholar).  
 43  RAMIREZ ET AL., 2014 DATA BROKERS REPORT, supra note 1, at i. 
 44  Jolly, supra note 25.   
 45  Amanda C. Border, Untangling the Web: An Argument for Comprehensive Data Privacy 
Legislation in the United States, 35 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV 363, 364–65 (2012). 
 46  Jolly, supra note 25 (citing the following examples of sector-specific regulatory laws: (1) the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLB), which regulates the collection, use, and disclosure of financial 
information; (2) The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), which regulates 
medical information; and the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), which applies to consumer reporting 
agencies).  
 47  RAMIREZ ET AL., 2014 DATA BROKERS REPORT, supra note 1, at i; JOHN IRONS & ISAAC 
SHAPIRO, REGULATION, EMPLOYMENT, AND THE ECONOMY, ECONOMIC POLICY INSTITUTE (2011), 
http://www.epi.org/publication/regulation_employment_and_the_economy_fears_of_job_loss_are_over
blown/ (Members of Congress justify deregulation on the grounds that “regulations raise cost for firms, 
thereby raising the costs of products, thereby leading to a reduction in sales and employment.”). 
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and state laws often involves regulations that “overlap, dovetail, and 
contradict one another,” making it difficult for an individual to protect his 
or her privacy.48 
Congress’s approach to data use and collection is based in part on the 
prevailing attitude that the privacy of personal data is an “economic issue 
rather than a fundamental right.”49 In the United States, personal 
information is frequently seen as a commodity that can be traded for goods 
and services.50 An assumption inherent in this market-based approach is that 
companies “have a legitimate interest in acquiring personal information for 
business purposes, and this should not be arbitrarily restricted [by privacy 
concerns].”51 Industry representatives argue that an “overly broad, 
prescriptive, one-size-fits-all [legislative] approach would hinder or 
undermine the ability of companies to innovate in a global economy.”52  
Consequentially, rather than adopting the Warren/Brandeis framework,53 
Americans view data privacy as one interest to be balanced against many 
others, treating it as secondary to other concerns.54 As such, an individual’s 
interest in privacy is often superseded by the interest in a business’s ability 
to acquire personal information.55 The issue with this commodification of 
data is that it lacks corresponding privacy protections for consumers, 
allowing companies to reign free without providing consumers with 
compensation, notice, or choice.56  
As a result of these underlying philosophies, Congress tends to 
respond reactively, rather than proactively, when addressing data privacy 
concerns.57 For instance, the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), which 
 
 48  Jolly, supra note 25; see also CAVOUKIAN, supra note 16, at 5 (“From the individual’s 
perspective, this patchwork of laws leaves a fragmented legal terrain that burdens, and possibly 
overwhelms, an individual’s ability to protect his or her privacy.”).  
 49  Morey Elizabeth Barnes, Falling Short of the Mark: The United States Response to the European 
Union’s Data Privacy Directive, 27 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 171, 175 (2006); see also RONALD B. 
STANDLER, FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS UNDER PRIVACY IN THE USA (2012), www.rbs2.com/priv2.pdf 
(demonstrating that the right to individual data does not qualify as a fundamental right) (“There are only 
a few fundamental rights that have been recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court under the classification 
of privacy [such as rearing children, procreation, marriage, and family].”). 
 50  CAVOUKIAN, supra note 16, at iv.  
 51  CAVOUKIAN, supra note 16, at 14.  
 52  Natasha Singer, Data Protection Laws, an Ocean Apart, N. Y. TIMES (Feb. 2, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/03/technology/consumer-data-protection-laws-an-ocean-
apart.html?_r=0 (statement by Kevin Richards, Senior Vice President of Federal Government Affairs at 
TechAmerica). 
 53  Smith, supra note 38.  
 54  Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, Reconciling Personal Information in the United States and 
European Union, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 877, 880 (2013).  
 55  CAVOUKIAN, supra note 16, at 14.  
 56  Id. (“[P]ersonal information now has some of the characteristics of a ‘public good,’ and, as such, 
is widely available.”). 
 57  Border, supra note 45, at 364–65.  
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regulates the use of individual data by consumer credit reporting agencies, 
was enacted in reaction to the “consumer horror stories of dealings with 
credit reporting agencies.”58 The Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (DPPA), 
which governs the dissemination of information obtained by the 
Department of Motor Vehicles, was a response to the “murder of an actress 
. . . who was tailed by a stalker who obtained her address . . . from state 
driver’s license records.”59 Further, the Video Privacy Protection Act 
(VPPA), passed in 1988, regulates the disclosure of tape rental or sale 
records.60 It was passed shortly after the video records of Judge Robert 
Bork were obtained and used by a news reporter in a campaign against his 
Supreme Court nomination.61 This reactive, sectoral legislative approach 
creates considerable inconsistencies in U.S. data privacy laws, leaving 
numerous sectors unregulated and considerable amounts of personal 
information unprotected.62  
 B. The Implications of Self-Regulation  
Because data brokers in the marketing industry are currently 
unregulated by data privacy legislation, they are controlled exclusively by 
self-regulation, which is defined as “self-created privacy standards based on 
the industry norm.”63 Industry trade associations, for example, have 
identified voluntary “best practice guidelines for [their] members.”64  Such 
recommendations include the Direct Marketing Association’s “Guidelines 
for Ethical Business Practice,” which contain recommendations on handling 
and protecting consumer information.65 Proponents of self-regulation argue 
that comprehensive legislation is too inflexible and time-dependent to keep 
up with the “fast-moving world of information technology.”66 Further, self-
regulation is seen as less bureaucratic and costly than abiding by federal 
restrictions.67  
 
 58  Shaffer, supra note 36, at 25.  
 59  Id.  
 60  18 U.S.C. § 2710 (1988).  
 61  Shaffer, supra note 36, at 25. 
 62 Jolly, supra note 25 (“Some [existing federal privacy laws] apply to particular categories of 
information, such as financial or health information, or electronic communications. Others apply to 
activities that use personal information, such as telemarketing or commercial e-mail.”). However, 
personal information used for marketing purposes is largely unregulated. See Schwartz & Solove, supra 
note 54, at 880.  
 63  Border, supra note 45, at 367–78; see also CAVOUKIAN, supra note 16, at 10 (“Self-regulation, as 
understood, means that a given business or industry sector establishes privacy rules among the firms that 
make up that sector.”).  
 64  S. COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCI., & TRANSP., supra note 10, at 4. 
 65  DIRECT MARKETING ASSOCIATION, DIRECT MARKETING ASSOCIATION GUIDELINES FOR 
ETHICAL BUSINESS PRACTICE 2 (2011).  
 66  CAVOUKIAN, supra note 16, at 8.  
 67  CAVOUKIAN, supra note 16, at 8–9 (“It is feared that government legislation will likely lead to an 
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But is self-regulation truly a substitute for comprehensive 
legislation?68  Unfortunately for the data broker industry, the answer is 
unequivocally no. For one, self-regulation is voluntary, meaning that the 
industry “can[not] discipline outliers who do not play by the rules.”69  
Consequentially, some companies abide by self-regulation while others do 
not, resulting in a fragmented and disparate system of privacy rules.70 In a 
Senate Judiciary Committee investigation, for example, the Committee 
found that respondent companies’ voluntary policies varied widely 
regarding consumer access and correction rights concerning consumers’ 
own data.71 This lack of uniformity is also largely due to the absence of 
another key component necessary for effective regulation: enforcement.72 
Though the FTC treats violations of a company’s own privacy policy as a 
“deceptive business practice,” it cannot touch companies who refuse to put 
up privacy policies in the first place.73 Moreover, FTC enforcement is 
“‘sporadic’ at best.”74 As of 2009, for example, the FTC had only listed 
twenty-five enforcement actions of this nature,75 undoubtedly leaving many 
companies free from regulation. 
Further, even when companies decide to “comply” with the industry 
norm, privacy experts argue that they put up smoke screens in place of 
legitimate privacy protections.76 Data brokers’ privacy policies, for 
example, appear to contain numerous provisions regarding individual rights 
 
overly bureaucratic and cumbersome regulatory process that will only result in raising the operating 
costs of the businesses involved.”).   
 68  Jedidiah Bracy, Will Industry Self-Regulation Be Privacy’s Way Forward?, THE PRIVACY 
ADVISOR (Jun. 24 2014), https://privacyassociation.org/news/a/will-industry-self-regulation-be-
privacys-way-forward (statement by Sally Greenberg, National Consumer League Executive Director) 
(“We are supporters of self-regulation as an industry practice but never as a substitute for the rule of 
law. Appropriate laws and regulations are necessary to ensure that all players have to abide by the same 
rule.”).  
 69  Id. (statement by Sally Greenberg, National Consumer League Executive Director).  
 70  The director of the SEC, for example, testified before Congress in 2008, stating, “We have 
learned that voluntary regulation does not work. . . . The lessons of the credit crisis all point to the need 
for strong and effective regulation.” IRONS & SHAPIRO, supra note 47; CAVOUKIAN, supra note 16, at 9.  
 71  Some companies have virtually no rights in their policies, while others, such as Acxiom, have 
more fulsome policies that allow for consumer access and correction. S. COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCI., & 
TRANSP., supra note 10, at iii.  
 72  Richard M. Marsh Jr., Legislation for Effective Self-Regulation: A New Approach to Protecting 
Personal Privacy on the Internet, 15 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 543, 555 (2009).  
 73  Id. 
 74  Id.; see also Marcy E. Peek, Information Privacy and Corporate Power: Towards a Re-
Imagination of Information Privacy Law, 37 SETON HALL L. REV. 127, 156 (2006) (describing the 
justification behind the FTC’s sporadic approach to enforcement) (“[F]TC enforcement actions tend to 
focus on heavy-weight companies that bring in headlines and settlements for the government. Thus, for 
example, in its few enforcement actions, the FTC has gone after companies such as Geocities, Equifax, 
Experian, Hersey Foods, Mrs. Field’s, and Quicken Loans.”).   
 75  Marsh Jr., supra note 72, at 555.   
 76  See Shaffer, supra note 36, at 27.  
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but actually reveal little to no information.77 These policies are often 
unintelligible, “full of electronic boilerplate,” and “often includ[e] a clause 
that reserves the company the right to change their data standards at any 
time.”78 Thus, “these ‘self-regulatory schemes’ remain voluntary, 
unenforceable, and . . . often ignored by the very companies advocating 
their use.”79 
 C. The FTC Report  
The FTC Report, which discussed the results of an in-depth study of 
nine data brokers, weighed the costs and benefits of big data in the 
marketing sector.80  According to the FTC, consumers benefit from data 
brokers’ collection and usage of their personal data.81  Such “benefits” 
include easier access to goods and services and increased innovative 
product offerings from a wider range of businesses.82  By acknowledging 
these advantages, the FTC added fuel to the central claim of data 
proponents that data always has some positive value.83  This premise, 
however, is false.84  The FTC should have used this opportunity to focus 
solely on the risks of the big data industry rather than watering down the 
negative effects of data broker practices with these so-called “advantages.”   
The FTC Report, however, did not completely drop the ball. It 
effectively addressed two major issues with data broker practices explained 
in detail below: (1) the fundamental lack of transparency of data brokers,85 
and (2) the “aggregation effect” of transforming raw data into insensitive, 
discriminatory categorizations.86  
 1. A Fundamental Lack of Transparency Equals Privacy 
Infringement  
According to the FTC, a “fundamental lack of transparency” exists 
behind data brokers’ practices.87 Data brokers collect consumer information 
from a wide-range of online and offline sources without the consumer’s 
 
 77  Marsh Jr., supra note 72, at 554.  
 78  Id. (citing Wayne B. Barnes, Rethinking Spyware: Questioning the Propriety of Contractual 
Consent to Online Surveillance, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1545, 1604 (2006)).  
 79  Shaffer, supra note 36, at 27.  
 80  RAMIREZ ET AL., 2014 DATA BROKERS REPORT, supra note 1, at i. 
 81  Id. at 47–48. 
 82  Id. 
 83  Kakaes, supra note 19.  
 84  Id.  
 85  RAMIREZ ET AL., 2014 DATA BROKERS REPORT, supra note 1, at vii. 
 86  Daniel J. Solove, Introduction: Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV. 
L. REV. 1879, 1889–90 (2013). 
 87  RAMIREZ ET AL., 2014 DATA BROKERS REPORT, supra note 1 at vii. 
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knowledge or consent.88 To further complicate the matter, data brokers 
purchase individual data from one another, creating an intricate web of 
information sharing that is nearly impossible for consumers to trace.89 
Though individuals often provide consumer-facing sources with 
information willingly, they are largely unaware that this information is then 
provided to data brokers in a different context for a different purpose.90 For 
instance, according to a recent study, “64% [of . . . people surveyed] do not 
know that a supermarket is allowed to sell other companies information 
about what [consumers] buy.”91 As a result, it is more likely than not that a 
simple purchase of Kashi cereal at the grocery store will place you in the 
“New Age/Organic Lifestyle” bucket in some data broker’s database.92  
Thus, data from even the simplest of consumer transactions can be bought, 
manipulated, and sold on the big data marketplace.93 
Even more troubling is the possibility that consumers who register on 
medical websites sometimes find their personal information entangled in a 
web of big data.94 This is particularly detrimental when the medical website 
is affiliated with sensitive conditions such as AIDS, diabetes, or depression.  
The FTC Report affirmed that some data brokers “sell marketing lists 
identifying consumers who have addictions, AIDS, HIV, [and] genetic 
diseases.”95 Data brokers are thus essentially “panning for gold”96 in 
consumers’ private matters for profit. In the words of FTC Commissioner 
Julie Brill who summed up such danger, “[w]hat damage is done to our 
individual sense of privacy and autonomy in a society in which information 
about some of the most sensitive aspects of our lives are available for 
analysts to examine . . . and for anyone to buy if they are willing to pay the 
going price?”97  
 2. The Aggregation Effect: With Distortion Comes Discrimination  
Most importantly, rather than merely collecting individual pieces of 
 
 88  Id. at vii.  
 89  Id. at 51.  
 90  Id. at 55 (The Commission voiced concerns about this issue numerous times, advocating that data 
brokers “take reasonable precautions to ensure that downstream users of their data do not use it for 
eligibility discriminations or for unlawful discriminatory purposes.”). 
 91  Solove, supra note 86, at 1886 (2013).  
 92  See RAMIREZ ET AL., 2014 DATA BROKERS REPORT, supra note 1, at 21. 
 93  See id. app. C-1 (concurring statement of Commissioner Julie Brill at C-4).   
 94  See id. 
 95  See RAMIREZ ET AL., 2014 DATA BROKERS REPORT, supra note 1, at 25 n.57.  
 96  Matt Kapko, supra note 18 (“Those who are aware should be shocked by the extent to which 
their online and offline behaviors are being sifted through for profit. Call it panning for gold in the 
digital age.”).  
 97  Julie Brill, Commissioner, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Keynote Address at the 23rd Computers 
Freedom and Privacy Conference, Reclaim Your Name (June 26, 2013).  
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raw data, data-collecting companies use learning algorithms to make 
inferences about consumers, placing them in categories related to ethnicity, 
income, religion, and political affiliations.98 After collecting raw data from 
a multitude of sources, data brokers merge this data, creating a “detailed 
composite” of the consumer’s life.99 This is called the “aggregation 
effect.”100 Proponents of the aggregation effect claim that these detailed 
personal profiles are “effective in the consumer marketplace and can deliver 
products and offers to precise segments of the population.”101 They argue 
that big data algorithms allow consumers to make purchase decisions based 
on their prior interests102 rather than starting from scratch. What they fail to 
note, however, is that many of these “detailed composites” are insensitive 
and serve as vehicles for discrimination.103 Many attempts to collect and 
aggregate data not only miss key factors, but transform for the worse the 
systems they claim to be measuring.104 According to the FTC, data brokers’ 
marketing products may facilitate the direct marketing of “health, ethnicity, 
or financial products,” which could trouble consumers and “undermine their 
trust in the marketplace.”105 
After collecting millions of data points from copious sources on a 
particular individual, data brokers place that consumer in “buckets” or 
categories designed to facilitate direct marketing.106 These buckets are the 
tools in which marketing companies target, exclude, and prey on individual 
consumers.  For instance, data brokers who categorize consumers by their 
ethnicity or financial situation make it easier for rapacious businesses to 
prey on them or subject them to differential pricing.107 Categories such as 
“Urban Scramble,”108 which describes consumers of largely African 
 
 98  See RAMIREZ ET AL., 2014 DATA BROKERS REPORT, supra note 1, at 19 (“In developing their 
products, the data brokers use not only the raw data they obtain from their sources, such as a person’s 
name, address, home ownership status, age, income range, or ethnicity . . . but they also derive 
additional data.”). 
 99  See RAMIREZ ET AL., 2014 DATA BROKERS REPORT, supra note 1, at 46. 
 100 Solove, supra note 86, at 1890 (2013). 
 101 EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA: SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES PRESERVING VALUES 7 
(2014), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/big_data_privacy_report_5.1.14_final_print. 
pdf [hereinafter WHITE HOUSE REPORT].  
 102 Jonathan Shaw, Why “Big Data” Is a Big Deal, HARV. MAG. (Mar.–Apr. 2014), 
http://harvardmagazine.com/2014/03/why-big-data-is-a-big-deal.  
 103 RAMIREZ ET AL., 2014 DATA BROKERS REPORT, supra note 1, at 20 n.52. 
 104 Kakaes, supra note 19.  
 105 RAMIREZ ET AL., 2014 DATA BROKERS REPORT, supra note 1, at 48. 
 106 S. COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCI., & TRANSP., supra note 10, at 6.  
 107 Id. at ii. It is important to note that, while FTC enforcement has been sporadic, the FTC has fined 
some companies for such unscrupulous activities. For example, in 2011, Teletrack, Inc., a data broker, 
sold lists of consumers who had previously applied for non-traditional credit products to third parties, 
primarily payday lenders and sub-prime auto lenders, that wanted to use the information to target 
consumers. The FTC charged Teletrack with a $1.8 million penalty as a result. See id. at 7.  
 108 RAMIREZ ET AL., 2014 DATA BROKERS REPORT, supra note 1, at 47. 
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American and Latino descent with low incomes, attract companies 
specializing in high-cost loans or financially-risky products who are looking 
to target populations likely to “need quick cash.”109 Moreover, data brokers 
have developed marketing tools to assist companies in “identify[ing] and 
effectively market[ing] to under-banked consumers,” which include “new 
legal immigrants, recent graduates, widows” and “consumers with 
transitory lifestyles, such as military personnel” who spend millions 
annually on payday loans and other “non-traditional” financial products.110  
Though categories such as “Financially Challenged” or “Underbanked” 
may “implicate creditworthiness,” the use of data about a consumer’s 
financial status for marketing purposes is generally not covered by the 
FRCA, unless the marketing is for certain pre-approved offers of credit.111  
A specific example of these discriminatory practices warrants 
attention. In 2007, InfoUSA, a data broker, sold lists of elderly consumers 
to individuals who used the lists to target senior citizens with fraudulent 
sales pitches.112 InfoUSA aggregated individual data and subsequently 
advertised lists of “Suffering Seniors,” people with cancer or Alzheimer’s 
disease, “Oldies but Goodies,” people over 55 who liked to gamble, and 
“Elderly Opportunity Seekers,” older people “looking for ways to make 
money.”113  One category explicitly said, “[t]hese people are gullible. They 
want to believe that their luck can change.”114 This “bucketing” of 
consumer data allowed telemarketers to purchase this information and trick 
vulnerable senior citizens into revealing their bank information in order to 
raid their accounts.115 Though the FTC Report did not investigate InfoUSA 
in particular, this example illustrates the risks raised by buckets identifying 
financially and physically vulnerable consumers.116  
 3. A Lack of Consumer Redress  
Consumers have little redress to ameliorate the privacy and 
discrimination concerns raised by big data. For one, as discussed above, 
consumers’ federal statutory rights in the marketing realm are basically 
 
 109 Other insensitive categories related to ethnicity and financial status include: “Ethnic Second-City 
Strugglers,” “Rural and Barely Making It,” “X-tra Needy,” “Small Town Shallow Pockets” and “Credit-
Crunched: City Families.” S. COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCI., & TRANSP., supra note 10, at 24–25. 
 110 Id. at 25.  
 111 RAMIREZ ET AL., 2014 DATA BROKERS REPORT, supra note 1, at 25 n.58. 
 112 Charles Duhigg, Bilking the Elderly, With a Corporate Assist, N. Y. TIMES, May 20, 2007, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/20/business/20tele.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.  
 113 Id.  
 114 Id.  
 115 Id.  
 116 See S. COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCI., & TRANSP., supra note 10, at 26. 
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nonexistent.117 Further, with the exception of information for pre-screened 
offers of credit or insurance, consumers do not have the right to control 
what personal information about them is collected and shared, even where 
such information concerns sensitive matters.118 Consumers also lack a 
statutory right to correct data inaccuracies.119  
Further, consumers are largely unaware of data brokers’ existence in 
the first place.120 Consequentially, “to the extent that some data brokers 
offer consumers the ability to correct or suppress their data, consumers [do 
not] know [of] these rights, rendering [them] illusory.”121 Even consumers 
who visit data broker websites are not given the whole picture. On their 
websites, data brokers generally provide access to raw data—age, name, 
and birthplace—while failing to disclose more problematic algorithm-based 
inferences such as “Urban Scramble,” leaving consumers largely in the 
dark.122 Simply seeing that a data broker knows that you are single between 
the ages of fifty and seventy-five is no cause for alarm. Seeing that a data 
broker has tagged you as an “older, down-scale and ethnically-diverse 
single” typically “between the ages of 50 and 75” who is part of the 
“underclass of the working poor and destitute seniors without family 
support,”123 however, is a completely different story. 
On the rare occasion that consumers actually gain access to 
information they wish to suppress, they are usually confronted with 
ambiguous and technical opt-out choices.124 Most consumers are unaware 
that, in the world of big data, “opt-out” is not synonymous with delete.125 
Instead, opt-out means “suppressing the consumer’s personal information 
from display in the data broker’s marketing products” while still keeping 
the information in the database.126 As a result, some data brokers continue 
to use suppressed information “in products that display data in an 
anonymous, aggregated form” rather than ceasing use altogether.127 “Opting 
out” of data use therefore does not relieve consumers of the privacy burdens 
 
 117 No federal law gives consumers the right “to know what information data brokers have compiled 
about them for marketing purposes, or even which data brokers hold such information.” Id. at 3. 
 118 Id.; While there is legislation pending in Congress aimed at improving the transparency behind 
data broker practices, such legislation fails to adequately address the privacy and discrimination 
concerns posed by data brokers. See, e.g., Data Broker Accountability and Transparency Act, S. 2025, 
113th Cong. (2014), https://www.congress.gov/113/bills/s2025/BILLS-113s2025is.pdf (Act introduced 
by Senators Jay Rockfeller and Ed Markey).  
 119 S. COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCI., & TRANSP., supra note 10, at 3. 
 120 RAMIREZ ET AL., 2014 DATA BROKERS REPORT, supra note 1, at C-3 (concurring statement of 
Commissioner Julie Brill at app. C-1).   
 121 Id.   
 122 RAMIREZ ET AL., 2014 DATA BROKERS REPORT, supra note 1, at 42. 
 123 S. COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCI., & TRANSP., supra note 10, at 25.  
 124 RAMIREZ ET AL., 2014 DATA BROKERS REPORT, supra note 1, at 49. 
 125 Id. 
 126 Id. at 42–43. 
 127 Id. at 43. 
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of big data⎯their information is still in the system regardless of their 
attempts to suppress it.   
In sum, the choices available to consumers, to the extent that they even 
exist, are mostly “invisible or incomplete.”128 Most of these choices are 
available ex post, providing consumers only with limited options after their 
data has been bought, aggregated, and sold.129 As a result, legislation should 
be enacted to impose ex ante regulations on data brokers, providing 
consumers with adequate safeguards before collection even takes place.130 
 II. THE FTC’S LEGISLATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS: A MISSED 
OPPORTUNITY FOR ADEQUATE REFORM   
The FTC recommended several pathways for Congress to remedy the 
“fundamental lack of transparency” surrounding data brokers in the United 
States.131 In light of its findings, the FTC suggested that Congress consider 
enacting legislation that would “enable consumers to learn of the existence 
and activities of data brokers and provide consumers with reasonable access 
to information . . . held by these entities.”132 Specifically, the Commission 
suggested Congress pass laws that would allow consumers to: (a) access 
their data, and (b) opt-out of having their personal information distributed 
for marketing purposes.133 
The FTC’s recommendations, though undoubtedly a step in the right 
direction, illustrated a “missed opportunity” to take a harder stance on data 
privacy rights.134 The recommendations place the majority of responsibility 
on the consumer to mitigate privacy and discrimination issues they may not 
even be aware of, adhering to the “same old privacy self-management 
model” that has crashed and burned in the past.135 Rather than protecting 
consumers from abusive practices, the legislative goals of the FTC force 
individuals to retroactively engage in damage control by making them 
search for their data and attempt to “opt-out” of its use. The FTC Report 
therefore focuses too exclusively on individual choice and not enough on 
the regulation of the big data industry itself.136  
 
 128 Id. at 49. 
 129 See Solove, supra note 86, at 1894 (describing the ex post, privacy self-management regime in 
the United States).  
 130 This would be a considerable change from the privacy self-management framework running 
rampant through the United States, and would ameliorate the bargaining position of individual 
consumers significantly. See generally id. 
 131 RAMIREZ ET AL., 2014 DATA BROKERS REPORT, supra note 1, at vii. 
 132 Id. at 49.  
 133 Id. at 50. 
 134 Lohr, supra note 24 (statement by Marc Rotenberg, Executive Director of the Electronic Privacy 
Information Center).  
 135 Solove, supra note 86, at 1883.  
 136 See id. at 1893. 
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  A. The Centralized Portal  
As an initial matter, the FTC suggested that Congress require data 
brokers to create a centralized Internet portal in which they identify 
themselves, describe their practices, and allow consumers to access their 
data at a “reasonable level of detail.”137 According to the FTC, Congress 
could enact legislation requiring consumer-facing sources to give notice 
that they share data with data brokers and to provide consumers with a link 
to the centralized portal.138 These sources would also have to give 
consumers the ability to opt-out or suppress data upfront.139 
Though the creation of such a centralized portal would increase 
transparency to a certain extent, it would not be an effective safeguard for 
consumers in an increasingly data-driven world.140 Such legislation would 
fail to provide adequate consumer redress for the following reasons. First, 
the FTC recommended that Congress only require a group of around fifty of 
the largest data brokers to participate.141 While this would shed some light 
on the practices of the most dominant players in the data-collection 
industry, it would leave the majority of private companies unchecked.142 
FTC Commissioner Josh Wright voiced similar concerns about the 
effectiveness of the portal, stating that the fifty largest data brokers “might 
be the ones with the most consumer-friendly practices,” leaving the smaller 
ones that “specialize in collecting and using more sensitive information” 
unchecked.143 For instance, Julia Angwin, an investigative journalist, found 
212 data brokers with her personal information after a month of trying to 
opt-out of data brokers’ websites.144 Angwin’s personal experience 
highlights the fact that disclosing the practices of a mere fifty data brokers 
 
 137 RAMIREZ ET AL., 2014 DATA BROKERS REPORT, supra note 1, at 50–51. 
 138 Id. at 52. 
 139 Id. 
 140 See Kapko, supra note 18 (“Data brokers are becoming increasingly important because. . . . 
[they] enhance the targeting efficiency [of marketing companies] by leveraging consumer data.”) 
(citation omitted); see also Adedapo, supra note 7 (“63 per cent of global businesses use analytics in 
creating [a] competitive advantage for their organisations.”).   
 141 RAMIREZ ET AL., 2014 DATA BROKERS REPORT, supra note 1, at 51. 
 142 Id.; see also Online List of Data Brokers, PRIVACY RTS. CLEARINGHOUSE, 
https://www.privacyrights.org/online-information-brokers-list (last visited Sept. 11, 2015) (this website 
posted a non-exhaustive 270 data brokers, which indicates that fifty participants do not constitute as a 
majority).  
 143 Christopher Wolf, The Hidden Mini Dissents in the Data Broker Report of Federal Trade 
Commissioner Wright, THE PRIVACY ADVISOR (July 31, 2014), 
https://privacyassociation.org/news/a/the-hidden-mini-dissents-in-the-data-broker-report-of-federal-
trade-commissioner-wright/.  
 144 Julia Angwin, Privacy Tools: Opting Out from Data Brokers, PROPUBLICA (Jan. 30, 2014, 12:29 
PM), http://www.propublica.org/article/privacy-tools-opting-out-from-data-brokers.  
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would not effectively remedy the extreme discrimination concerns facing 
individuals.145  
Second, such legislation would only require that data brokers on the 
portal allow consumers access to information at a “reasonable level of 
detail,” and that they disclose any information that they deem “sensitive.”146 
This allows data brokers to reveal only a sliver of the extensive amount of 
data in their possession, providing them with the same self-regulation 
accepted in the past. Though this recommendation would regulate data 
brokers to the extent that it compels them to disclose “sensitive” data, this is 
a largely subjective requirement. In fact, the FTC itself acknowledged that 
what qualifies as sensitive often lies in the eye of the beholder.147 By 
recommending that data brokers should include “categories that some 
consumers might find sensitive and others may not,”148 the FTC failed to 
draw any semblance of a line.149 While certain data, such as whether a 
consumer has AIDS, would qualify as sensitive across the board,150 other 
categories are not so straightforward. Labels regarding one’s ethnicity or 
financial status,151 for instance, may not be deemed subjectively sensitive 
enough to pass the threshold.   
Even assuming data brokers, courts, and/or agencies will err on the 
side of an overbroad classification of sensitive information, this suggestion 
fails to address the main vehicle for discrimination in the data broker 
industry: consumer bucketing via data aggregation.152 Though the 
disclosure of potentially sensitive raw data would put consumers on alert of 
discrimination to a certain extent, many sensitive buckets arising from 
aggregation, such as “Urban Scramble,”153 could be left out of the portal. 
Thus, the limited amount of data brokers required to participate in the 
portal, combined with the wide discretion of data brokers regarding what 
they disclose, renders this suggestion inadequate. Legislation is needed to 
 
 145 See, e.g., Duhigg, supra note 112 (exemplifying how data brokers can discriminate against and 
take advantage of the elderly). 
 146 RAMIREZ ET AL., 2014 DATA BROKERS REPORT, supra note 1, at 51. 
 147 Id. 
 148 Id.  
 149 For an example of a better-defined line regarding what constitutes as “sensitive,” see Data 
Directive, supra note 35, art. 8(1).  
 150 RAMIREZ ET AL., 2014 DATA BROKERS REPORT, supra note 1, at 51. 
 151 For example, a consumer labeled by brokers as “Financially Challenged,” which describes single 
parents in their “prime working years” who are “struggl[ing] with some of the lowest incomes” and are 
“[n]ot particularly loyal to any one financial institution,” might find this label offensive or overtly 
sensitive. Id. at 20 n.52.  
 152 FTC Report on Data Brokers Fails to Address Consumer Privacy Concerns, EPIC (May 27, 
2014), https://epic.org/privacy/choicepoint/ (“The Commission recommended modest legislative 
changes and failed to address many of consumers’ privacy concerns, including profiling and ‘scoring’ of 
consumers.”); see also supra Part II(C)(ii).  
 153 RAMIREZ ET AL., 2014 DATA BROKERS REPORT, supra note 1, at 47. 
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“help stem the tide of business practices purposefully designed to make a 
mockery out of the idea of privacy for Americans.”154 The centralized 
portal, while good in theory, would not satisfy this purpose.  
 B. Other Legislative Recommendations  
In addition to the centralized portal, the FTC recommended that 
Congress consider legislation requiring data brokers to disclose to 
consumers on their websites that they not only use raw data collected from 
sources but also derive data from certain algorithms.155 Due to the current 
lack of publicity surrounding data brokers, it is unlikely that most 
consumers would even visit these websites to learn about this information.  
Even if a centralized portal existed to increase consumer awareness, merely 
giving consumers notice of the existence of these derived inferences does 
not in itself allow consumers access to elements that could qualify as 
politically sensitive.  
Further, the FTC suggested that Congress should require data brokers 
to disclose the names or categories of their sources of data on their websites 
so consumers can better correct incorrect data or opt-out of its use.156  
However, due to the convoluted web of data sources, it would be almost 
impossible for data brokers to disclose a comprehensive list.157 In order for 
a consumer to actually correct data, the consumer usually would have to 
“retrace the path of data through a series of data brokers to finally arrive at 
the original source.”158 The Commission, in this suggestion to Congress, 
proposes an abstract solution that is out of touch with reality.  
The FTC did not misfire entirely, however—one key recommendation 
established the ex ante controls needed to adequately protect consumers.  
The FTC Report suggested that Congress require consumer-facing 
sources—businesses, such as help desks that consumers deal with 
directly—to obtain consumers’ affirmative express consent before 
collecting and distributing sensitive information.159 This recommendation, 
unlike the rest, places the burden of privacy protection on the controller 
rather than the consumer.160 Yet the FTC still failed to eliminate industry 
self-regulation completely. As discussed above, what qualifies as 
 
 154 John Eggerton, Reaction Mixed to FTC Data Broker Report, B&C (May 27, 2014, 2:57 PM), 
http://www.broadcastingcable.com/news/washington/reaction-mixed-ftc-data-broker-report/131403 
(statement by Jeff Chester, Executive Director of the Center for Digital Democracy).  
 155 RAMIREZ ET AL., 2014 DATA BROKERS REPORT, supra note 1, at 52.  
 156 Id.  
 157 See id. at 46. 
 158 Id. at 14. 
 159 Id. at 52. 
 160 This recommendation would be a necessary step away from the all-too-common privacy self-
management model. See Solove, supra note 86, at 1880 (“Privacy self-management does not provide 
people with meaningful control over their data.”). 
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“sensitive” is largely discretionary,161 and consumer protection is not 
guaranteed. The Commission should have taken it one step further and 
mirrored the EU Data Directive’s requirement that consumer-facing sources 
obtain affirmative consent for all consumer information used in direct 
marketing,162 no matter how innocuous. Nonetheless, this suggestion came 
the closest to hitting the nail on the head in terms of adequate data privacy 
legislation. The following section addresses why more comprehensive 
legislation should be established based on specific individual consumer 
protection provisions within the EU’s Data Privacy Directive.  
 III. THE EUROPEAN WAY OR THE HIGHWAY  
The FTC Report as a whole, while aiming for increased transparency 
in the data broker industry, missed the mark on one crucial point: it placed 
the burden of mitigating privacy and discrimination concerns on the 
consumer, rather than on the industry.163 True amelioration of consumer 
rights will not be achieved until legislation is enacted which calls both for 
the increased transparency, and more importantly, accountability, of the 
data broker industry.164 Thus, consumer-friendly provisions should be 
enacted similar to specific individual privacy provisions within the EU’s 
Data Directive, which burden data brokers with privacy management 
concerns, rather than consumers. First, I will provide relevant background 
of the EU Privacy Regime that led to the eventual privacy protections of the 
EU’s Data Directive. Then, I will discuss the specific provisions of the Data 
Directive that should be used to draft a more consumer-friendly legislative 
framework.   
 A. The EU’s Approach to Data Privacy  
Though data privacy laws in the EU are similar to those in the United 
States with respect to common goals and origins, they differ drastically in 
their general approach to the protection of personal information.165 Privacy 
regulation is triggered when “personally identifiable information” (“PII”) is 
at stake in both regions, but what constitutes PII in the EU and United 
 
 161 RAMIREZ ET AL., 2014 DATA BROKERS REPORT, supra note 1, at 51. 
 162 See Data Directive, supra note 35, art. 14(b).  
 163 RAMIREZ ET AL., 2014 DATA BROKERS REPORT, supra note 1, app. C-1 (concurring statement of 
Commissioner Julie Brill at C-7); Industry regulation is more effective than consumer self-management 
of privacy. See Solove, supra note 86, at 1880–81 (“Privacy self-management does not provide people 
with meaningful control over their data. . . . There are too many entities collecting and using personal 
data to make it feasible for people to manage their privacy . . . .”). 
 164 RAMIREZ ET AL., 2014 DATA BROKERS REPORT, supra note 1, app. C-7 
 165 Border, supra note 45, at 372. 
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States varies considerably.166 The Data Directive defines “personal data” 
broadly as “information relating to an identified or identifiable natural 
person,”167 whereas the U.S. definition is far narrower and less consistent.168  
Instead of defining personal information in a coherent manner, privacy law 
in the United States offers multiple competing definitions.169 Neither federal 
nor state law “agree on a single term that identifies the basic category of 
personal information.”170 The Video Privacy Protection Act (VPPA), for 
example, defines personally identifiable information as “information that 
defines a person,” whereas the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) defines 
personally identifiable information as “nonpublic personal information.”171  
This incongruence largely exists due to the inherent philosophical 
differences in the two regions.172  Unlike the United States, the EU views 
privacy as a fundamental human right.173 The Convention on Human Rights 
and Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Human Rights recognizes the 
fundamental right to the protection of personal data.174 Further, the 
European Union has recently recognized the “right to be forgotten,” which 
is described as the right to delete “any information related to a data 
subject.”175 After the Data Directive recognized a general right to Internet 
protection for individuals, the European Commission took data privacy one-
step further by introducing a draft European Data Protection Regulation 
which specifically included the right to be forgotten.176 The core provision 
 
 166 Schwartz & Solove, supra note 54, at 881.  
 167 Data Directive, supra note 35, art. 2(a).   
 168 See Schwartz & Solove, supra note 54, at 881.  
 169 See Schwartz & Solove, supra note 54, at 887. 
 170 Id. 
 171 This is largely due to the piecemeal approach of the United States regarding data privacy 
legislation. Id. (“When information is identifiable enough to fall within the scope of a particular statute 
relies .  on the specific definition within each privacy statute.”) 
 172 Schwartz & Solove, supra note 54, at 880–81.  
 173 Andrew J. McClurg, A Thousand Words Are Worth a Picture: A Privacy Tort Response to 
Consumer Data Profiling, 98 NW. U. L. REV 63, 90 n.174 (2003) (“Western European governments have 
long viewed privacy as a fundamental human right.”).  
 174 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for 
signature Nov. 4, 1950, Europ. T.S. No. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, art. 8 §1 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953), 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf (“Everyone has the right to respect for his 
private and family life, his home and his correspondence.”); Charter of Fundamental Human Rights of 
the European Union 2000/C, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1 (EC) art. 8 §1 (“Everyone has the right to personal 
data concerning him or her.”). 
 175 Jeffrey Rosen, The Right to Be Forgotten, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 88, 89 (2012).  
 176 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of 
Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, at 
9, COM (2012) 11 final (Jan. 25, 2012), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
protection/document/review2012/com_2012_11_en.pdf (Providing an explanation of Article 17, the 
“Right to Be Forgotten and to Erasure”); While the “right to be forgotten” is similar to the U.S. system 
in that it allows consumers to correct or opt-out of publicly available information, it differs from the 
United States to a considerable extent. Under the “right to be forgotten,” a state can require a passive 
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of the right to be forgotten is simple: “if an individual no longer wants his 
personal data to be processed or stored by a data controller, and if there is 
no legitimate reason for keeping it, the data should be removed from the 
system.”177 Due to these explicit safeguards, protection of personal data is 
not a “subject you can bargain about” in the EU.178  
The Data Directive was first adopted in 1995 and was designed as a 
comprehensive piece of legislation that aimed to increase the fluidity of 
cross-border data transfer while simultaneously requiring an absolute 
recognition of individual privacy rights.179 The EU’s final trade 
liberalization rules in the Data Directive were strongly influenced by the 
stringent data privacy protection standards of Germany and France, due to 
their extensive pull in the market.180 These political considerations ensured 
that the Directive’s “twin objects”181 were inseparable, ratcheting up the 
importance of data privacy in the marketing sphere.182   
Though “the EU Directive itself does not impose obligations directly 
on people or businesses,” it requires that each EU member state enact laws 
that govern the processing of personal data in line with its standards.183 In 
order to monitor and enforce these laws, each member state must create a 
data protection authority.184 To date, all member states have enacted laws in 
accordance with the Directive’s standards,185 signifying its effectiveness in 
the EU. Certain consumer-friendly standards embedded in the Directive 
 
processor of information like Google to actively interfere with the ability of users to pull up certain 
kinds of individual information. This does not exist in the United States, where the presumption is 
against government interference in the free flow of information. See  Daniel Fisher, Europe’s ‘Right to 
Be Forgotten’ Clashes With U.S. Right to Know, FORBES (May 16, 2014, 8:45 AM),  
http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2014/05/16/europes-right-to-be-forgotten-clashes-with-u-s-
right-to-know/ (“The decision [by the Court of Justice of the European Union regarding the “right to be 
forgotten”] treats search engines like publishers, with the power to pick and choose what other people 
can see when they type in an individual’s name. That conflicts directly with U.S. law, which protects the 
free flow of information through the First Amendment . . . .”). 
 177 “[T]he intellectual roots of the right to be forgotten can be found in French law, which recognizes 
le droit a l’oubli—or “the right of oblivion”—a right that allows a convicted criminal who has served his 
time and been rehabilitated to object to the publication of the facts of his conviction and incarceration.” 
Rosen, supra note 175, at 88. 
 178 Shaffer, supra note 36, at 19.  
 179 Border, supra note 45, at 372. 
 180 Shaffer, supra note 36, at 11. 
 181 The EU has “twin ‘objects,’” which are (1) to “protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of 
natural persons, and in particular their right to privacy with respect to the processing of personal data” 
and (2) to neither restrict nor prohibit the free flow of personal data between Member States.” Shaffer, 
supra note 36, at 12. 
 182 Shaffer, supra note 36, at 11–12. 
 183 HARVEY L. KAPLAN, MARK W. COWING, & GABRIEL P. EGLI, SHOOK, HARDY, & BACON L.L.P., 
A PRIMER FOR DATA-PROTECTION PRINCIPLES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 37, 40 (2009), 
http://www.shb.com/attorneys/CowingMark/APrimerforDataProtectionPrinciples.pdf.  
 184 Data Directive, supra note 35, art. 28.  
 185 KAPLAN, COWING, & EGLI, supra note 183, at 40. 
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could work wonders in protecting individuals in the United States, and 
should be used as a layout for Congress. These particular provisions are 
explored in depth below.  
 B. Individual Privacy Protections in the Data Directive: Models for 
U.S. Legislative Reform  
Contrary to the arguments of U.S. officials, “the sum of the parts of 
U.S. privacy protection is not greater to or equal to the single whole” of 
Europe’s Data Directive.186 Unlike legislation in the United States, which 
leaves personal data largely unprotected in the private sector, the Data 
Directive covers all private sector processing of personal data.187 Further, 
the Data Directive levies ex ante controls on these data “controllers,”188 
reigning in their ability to “mix, match, buy, sell, and trade profiles and 
dossiers” containing personal and potentially sensitive consumer 
information.189 Upon data collection, the controller must inform the data 
subject of the controller’s identity and the purposes of processing the 
data.190 The consumer maintains the right to have inaccurate data corrected, 
and the right to withhold personal information in some circumstances.191  
Unlike the technical and confusing “opt-out choices” facing consumers in 
the United States, the Data Directive is clear: consumers have the right to 
access, correct, and object to the processing of their personal data.192  
Arguably, the most important of these rights is the Directive’s explicit right 
to object, which provides that data subjects can object “at any time on 
compelling legitimate grounds relating to [their] particular situation to the 
processing of data relating to [them].”193 If the objection is successful, the 
controller may no longer process the piece of data in question.194 This 
differs considerably from the U.S. opt-out process in which the opted-out 
personal information still remains in the data broker’s database and can be 
used later for “anonymous” purposes.195 
More importantly, the Data Directive contains a provision specific to 
marketing, requiring that individuals “be informed before personal data [is] 
 
 186 Singer, supra note 52.  
 187 Data Directive, supra note 35, art. 2(d).   
 188 Id.. (The term “controller” is broadly defined to include any “natural or legal person, public 
authority, agency or any other body which alone or jointly with others determines the purposes and 
means of the processing of personal data”).  
 189 Shaffer, supra note 36 at 26.   
 190 Data Directive, supra note 35, art.10(c).  
 191 See Data Directive, supra note 35, art.10(c). 
 192 Data Directive, supra note 35, arts. 12(a), 12(b), 14(a).  
 193 Id. art. 14(a).  
 194 FRA, HANDBOOK ON EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION LAW 114 (2014), 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Handbook_data_protection_ENG.pdf. 
 195 RAMIREZ ET AL., 2014 DATA BROKERS REPORT, supra note 1, at 43. 
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disclosed for the first time to third parties for the purposes of direct 
marketing, and to be expressly offered the right to object free of charge to 
such disclosures or uses.”196 Unlike the FTC Report’s recommendation 
requiring affirmative consent for the processing of sensitive information,197 
this provision gives consumers control over all information used for direct 
marketing at the outset. Rather than requiring consumers to find and control 
their personal data retroactively, EU consumers have ex ante control over 
their data, eliminating the ever-elusive opt-out conundrum198 facing 
consumers today. Further, legislation inclusive of this provision would 
allow consumers to gain control before potentially sensitive or incorrect 
data is launched into the never-ending black hole of big data exchange.199 
The third provision that should be used as a roadmap for U.S. 
legislation is the Data Directive’s requirement that Member States prohibit 
the processing of sensitive information unless an individual affirmatively 
opts-in to such processing.200 Unlike in the United States where the term 
“sensitive” is problematically discretionary,201 sensitive information 
covered by the Data Directive includes “personal data revealing racial or 
ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-
union membership, and the processing of data concerning health or sex 
life.”202 If a similar provision were adopted in the United States, potentially 
discriminatory data segments, such as “Bible Lifestyle” or “Leans Left,”203 
would be prohibited from circulation without affirmative consumer consent.  
This would shield consumers from unequal treatment from direct marketers 
and would protect them from being placed in offensive or inaccurate data 
categories, strengthening their position in the market as a whole. As a 
result, data brokers would no longer be able to freely profile a man as a 
“Timeless Tradition”204 on the grounds that he is a retiree who immigrated 
 
 196 Data Directive, supra note 35, art. 14(b); This differs considerably from the United States, where 
“retailers also don’t make it easy to for you to find out whether they’re selling your information.” Lois 
Beckett, Everything We Know About What Data Brokers Know About You, PROPUBLICA (June 13, 2014, 
12:59 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/everything-we-know-about-what-data-brokers-know-
about-you.  
 197 RAMIREZ ET AL., 2014 DATA BROKERS REPORT, supra note 1, at 52. 
 198 Id. at 49. 
 199 Id. at 46 (“[It is] virtually impossible for a consumer to determine how a data broker obtained his 
or her data; the consumer would have to retrace the path of data through a series of data brokers.”). 
 200 Data Directive, supra note 35, art. 8(1).  
 201 As discussed above, what counts as “sensitive” varies largely from person to person. Having a 
fixed standard would decrease the exorbitant amount of self-regulation that exists in American 
companies today. See Ramirez, supra note 1, at 51. 
 202 Data Directive, supra note 35, art. 8(1). 
 203 RAMIREZ ET AL., 2014 DATA BROKERS REPORT, supra note 1, at 21. 
 204 Id. at 20 n.52 (“‘Timeless Traditions,’ which includes ‘immigrants, many of retirement age, . . . 
who have been in the country for 10 or more years,’ that ‘speak[] some English, but generally prefer[] 
Spanish and that have ‘lower than average’ incomes.”).  
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to the United States. Most consumers would refuse to opt-in to such 
stereotypical categories voluntarily, and consequentially would have much 
more control over the release and circulation of potentially sensitive 
information.   
These ex ante controls alone would help shift the burden of protection 
from consumers, as suggested by the FTC, to the data brokers compiling, 
manipulating, and distributing consumer information.205 The more 
information consumers are provided with at the outset, the stronger their 
negotiating positions will be.206 It should be noted, however, that certain 
controls are subject to exceptions for business-flexibility purposes, which 
hinders privacy protections to some extent.207 Nevertheless, subjecting data 
brokers to such controls will arguably increase their accountability and 
transparency in the marketplace. 
Further, the EU Directive imposes “ex post controls on enterprises,” 
allowing consumers the ability to access, monitor, and challenge personal 
data post-processing.208 Adding a similar provision in U.S. legislation 
would allow American consumers to seek redress for discriminatory or 
invasive tactics employed by data brokers, while simultaneously increasing 
the accountability of data brokers.  
Last, in contrast with the lack of enforcement running rampant in the 
U.S. self-regulatory regime,209 failure to comply with the Directive results 
in more than just a slap on the wrist. Those who violate the Directive could 
be subject to two different kinds of liability.210 First, the Directive requires 
that each member state establish sanctions for infringement of its 
provisions.211 Such sanctions can take the form of fines and/or 
imprisonment.212 Germany, for example, has provided for administrative 
fines of “up to €250,000 per violation—the highest administrative fine in 
 
 205 This is a considerable change from the privacy self-management framework running rampant 
through the United States, and would ameliorate the bargaining position of individual consumers 
significantly. See generally Solove, supra note 86, at 1894.  
 206 Shaffer, supra note 36, at 34.  
 207 Data Directive, supra note 35, art.7, (Controllers may process information without consent in 
instances where the processing is: (i) “necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data 
subject is party,” (ii) “necessary for compliance with a legal obligation,” (iii) “necessary in order to 
protect the vital interests of the data subject,” (iv)”necessary for the performance of a task carried out in 
the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller or in a third party to 
whom the data are disclosed,” and (v) “necessary for the purposes of legitimate interests pursued by the 
controller or by the third party or parties to whom the data are disclosed, except where such interests are 
overridden by the interests for fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require 
protection under Article 1(1).”).   
 208 Shaffer, supra note 36, at 26.  
 209 Marsh Jr., supra note 72, at 555. 
 210 KAPLAN, COWING, & EGLI, supra note 183, at 40. 
 211 Data Directive, supra note 35, art. 24.  
 212 KAPLAN, COWING, & EGLI, supra note 183, at 40. 
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the EU.”213 Further, in addition to fining violators, French law permits 
imprisonment for up to five years.214 In addition to requiring sanctions, the 
Directive mandates that member states “provide that any person who has 
suffered damage as a result of an unlawful processing operation or of any 
act incompatible with the national provisions adopted pursuant to this 
Directive is entitled to receive compensation from the controller for the 
damage suffered.”215 Thus, there is an explicit provision allowing 
individuals to recover civilly as well.216 Adopting similar enforcement 
tactics in U.S. legislation would give consumers far more redress than 
provided for in the FTC Report’s recommendations to Congress. Rather 
than waiting for the FTC to flag down companies employing “deceptive 
business practices,”217 legislation mirroring this provision would ensure that 
all data brokers comply with the comprehensive privacy standards outlined 
above; if they refused, criminal sanctions or civil suits would be waiting.218  
This would not only give consumers control of their personal data, but 
would also increase the accountability of the predominantly invisible data 
broker industry.  
These specific provisions in the Data Directive should serve as a 
model for comprehensive legislation in the United States. Congress should 
stop subordinating privacy and discrimination concerns in favor of the 
business interests of the marketing sector and make consumer rights a 
priority. Without adequate comprehensive legislation, consumers will 
continue to carry the burden of protecting themselves against the privacy 
infringement and unfair treatment resulting from data brokers’ practices.   
 CONCLUSION  
In the words of Anthony Burgess, “To be left alone is the most 
precious thing one can ask of the modern world.”219 This rings especially 
true today in a world that is increasingly driven by the vogue for big data.220  
Though the 2014 FTC Report served as an informative privacy wake up 
call,221 its bark was much bigger than its bite. The FTC’s legislative 
 
 213 Id. at 46 n.17. 
 214 Id.  
 215 Data Directive, supra note 35, art. 23(1).  
 216 KAPLAN, COWING, & EGLI, supra note 183, at 40. 
 217 See Marsh Jr., supra note 72, at 555.  
 218 It should be noted that only the Department of Justice (DOJ) has the power to seek criminal 
sanctions. The FTC, however, may refer matters to the DOJ for criminal enforcement. See, e.g., 15 
U.S.C. § 46(k) (2006).  
 219 ANTHONY BURGESS, HOMAGE TO QWERT YUIOP: ESSAYS (1986).  
 220 Kakaes, supra note 19.  
 221 Lohr, supra note 24 (statement by Jeffrey Chester, Executive Director of the Center for Digital 
Democracy). 
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recommendations lacked the teeth necessary to address the current privacy 
and discrimination concerns facing American consumers today. The 
practices of data brokers, in particular the aggregation of raw data into 
potentially discriminatory categories, do more than just impose upon a 
consumer’s “right to be let alone.”222 They also subject individuals to unfair 
and predatory practices, differential pricing, and other negative treatment by 
marketing companies.223  
This Comment serves as a call for Congress to stop sporadically 
reacting to data privacy concerns. Instead, it must proactively pass 
comprehensive legislation mirroring the Data Directive’s individual 
protections. Regulations must be imposed ex ante, rather than ex post, and 
the only way to do this is to abandon the self-regulatory approach of data 
brokers completely.  It is time for Congress to act. The question remains if 
it will.  
 
 222 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 38, at 213 n.1.  
 223 S. COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCI., & TRANSP., supra note 10, at 6. 
